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Ursula K. Le Guin’s Science Fictional Feminist Daoism 
Ethan Mills 




It is hardly a novel claim that the work of Ursula K. Le Guin (1929–2018) contains influences from 
philosophical Daoism, but I argue that this influence has yet to be fully understood. Several scholars 
criticize Le Guin for misrepresenting Daoist ideas as they appear in ancient Chinese philosophical 
texts, particularly the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi. While I have sympathy for this charge, especially 
as it relates to Le Guin’s translation of the Dao De Jing, I argue that it fails to understand the extent to 
which her fiction contains her own philosophical development of Daoist ideas. Looking at some of 
her most influential works (e.g., The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, The Lathe of Heaven, A 
Wizard of Earthsea, etc.), I suggest that Le Guin’s fiction is better seen as a refocusing of Daoist 
concepts such as complementary contrasts and non-action (wu wei) in the contexts of modern 
feminism, modern anarchism, science fiction, and fantasy. Le Guin was not trying to represent ancient 
Daoism as a scholar. Rather, she was trying to reimagine Daoism as a creative artist and philosopher 
in her own right. This way of viewing Le Guin’s work does not fully exorcise the specter of the 
possibility of Orientalist cultural appropriation, but it does make the issue more complex in a way 
that can deepen further conversations. To what extent can an artist be guilty of misrepresentation if 
representation was not, strictly speaking, her goal? I end with a brief reflection on what is perhaps 
the deepest philosophical lesson of Le Guin’s work: everything is more complicated than it first 
appears. On that note, the present article is an attempt not just to do philosophy about Le Guin, but 
to do philosophy in a Le Guinian fashion, which requires rethinking the metaphor of combat that 
guides much academic philosophy today. 
 
In January 2018 the world of science fiction and fantasy lost one of its greatest authors. 
Ursula K. Le Guin (1929–2018) was a major voice in the field for over 50 years, extending 
from the publication of her first novels in the 1960s to her famous speech upon winning the 
Medal for Distinguished Contribution to American Letters in 2014.1 Le Guin’s work 
combines literary quality, daring science fictional and fantastic ideas, and deep 
interrogations of topics including gender, economics, class, race, value, cultural difference, 
violence, ecology, physics, and more. Few writers of any genre have blurred the lines 
between philosophy and literature as much as Le Guin. While scholars of literature have 
seriously studied Le Guin’s work since the 1970s, there has been comparatively little 
attention from philosophers. I think this is a shame, because the philosophical aspects of 
her work, especially the place of philosophical Daoism, have yet to be fully understood. I 
suspect we have much to learn.2 
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While Le Guin is widely respected among science fiction fans, she has been criticized 
for misrepresenting Daoist ideas as they appear in ancient Chinese philosophical texts. I 
have some sympathy for this charge, yet I argue that it fails to understand the extent to 
which her fiction contains her own philosophical development of Daoist ideas. Looking at 
some of her most influential works (e.g., The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, The 
Lathe of Heaven, A Wizard of Earthsea, etc.), I suggest that Le Guin’s fiction is better seen as 
a refocusing of Daoist concepts such as complementary contrasts and non-action (wu wei) 
in the contexts of modern feminism, modern anarchism, science fiction, and fantasy. Le 
Guin was not trying to represent ancient Daoism as a scholar. Rather, she was trying to 
reimagine Daoism as a creative artist and philosopher in her own right. This way of viewing 
Le Guin’s work does not fully exorcise the specter of the possibility of Orientalist cultural 
appropriation, but it does make the issue more complex. To what extent can an artist be 
guilty of misrepresentation if representation was not, strictly speaking, her goal? I end with 
a brief reflection on what is perhaps the deepest philosophical lesson of Le Guin’s work: 
everything is more complicated than it first appears. 
Methodological Prelude 
Before I dive into the substance of this paper, it will help to explain one aspect of it that 
may strike some readers as strange. I am not merely attempting to give a typical 
philosophical argument about Le Guin. Rather, the present paper is an attempt to do 
philosophy in a Le Guinian mode. 
Most contemporary academic philosophy proceeds according to the guiding 
metaphor of combat, which according to Sarah Mattice has three main characteristics. 
 
1. Philosophers become adversaries or combatants. 
2. The structure of the philosophical activity becomes one of strategic 
maneuvering, where the movement is conceived in terms of attack, defense, 
retreat, counterattack, stalemate, surrender, and victory. 
3. The purpose of the dialogue becomes victory—to win and defeat the opponent. 
(Mattice 2014, 30) 
 
I do not have space in this paper to fully explain or defend the notion that 
philosophers are guided by underlying metaphors (see Mattice 2014, Ch. 1 for one such 
attempt), nor will I explain other possible metaphors such as play or aesthetic experience 
(see Mattice 2014, Ch. 3 and Ch. 4). I merely ask readers, as they read this paper, to keep an 
open mind to the idea that some of what look like faults from one perspective may be 
strengths from another. 
I will leave the details of Le Guinian philosophy deliberately open in the present 
context. But I will suggest that rather than viewing philosophy as combat, Le Guinian 
philosophy could see philosophy as a continuing conversation—sometimes playful, 
sometimes serious, often ambiguous, often open-ended, always nuanced, and always 
deeply influenced by the Daoist elements I describe in the next section. 
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Daoist Ideas in Le Guin’s Fiction 
Daoism was not a faddish or casual interest of Le Guin’s. She reports that her father always 
had a copy of the Dao De Jing on hand during her childhood, a book that greatly influenced 
her throughout her life (Le Guin 1998, ix; Li 2016, 166–167). She even published her own 
translation of the text in the 1990’s (Laozi 1998). She admitted her Daoist influences in 
numerous interviews and essays.3 Scholars have documented the influence of Daoism in Le 
Guin’s fiction since the 1970’s.4 Here I would like to focus on a few illustrative examples 
from Le Guin’s fiction that take up Daoist concepts of complementary contrasts and non-
action (wu wei).  
The core of classical Chinese Daoist philosophy is often considered to consist of two 
texts: Dao De Jing (or Laozi) and Zhuangzi. The possibly legendary author Laozi is said to 
have lived in the 5th century BCE, but the text traditionally attributed to this author reached 
a stable form in the 3rd century BCE. Zhuangzi was most likely a real person who lived in 
China in the 4th century BCE, while the text associated with his name reached its present 
form in the 3rd or 4th century CE. I will not delve further into questions of authorship or 
textual history, interesting as they are. Nor do I mean to deny the existence of later 
developments in Daoist philosophy or religious practice throughout history in China and 
elsewhere.5 It is an understatement to say that the Laozi and Zhuangzi are themselves 
incredibly rich and complex texts subject to multiple, sometimes competing, 
interpretations. Much like Le Guin’s work, the Laozi and the Zhuangzi may even be 
specifically designed to resist easy encapsulation, swift digestion, or quick summary. My 
summaries below should not be thought of as exhaustive or authoritative, but rather as 
sketches of basic themes that arise in the texts. 
Complementary Contrasts 
The phrase “complementary contrasts” is used by scholar of Daoist philosophy Steve 
Coutinho (2014, 40–43) to pick out what is perhaps most famously represented in the taiji 
symbol, sometimes known as the yin-yang. Coutinho notes that yin and yang originally 
referred to the shady and sunny sides of a mountain (Coutinho 2014, 40–41). 
The Daoist view . . . is that contrasts do not conflict but rather mutually complement 
each other . . . [E]ach is incomplete without the other, and the momentum of 
transformation between yin and yang phases is kept going by mutual yielding, not 
mutual aggression. Lastly, between yin and yang lies not a sharp and precisely 
defined boundary, but an extended phase of yin-becoming-yang and between yang 
and yin is a phase of yang-becoming-yin. There is no single precise point at which 
one can be said to begin and the other end; each blends smoothly into the other 
across a penumbra of vagueness. (Coutinho 2014, 42) 
While yin and yang are explicitly mentioned only once in the Laozi in chapter 42 and 
a few times in the Zhuangzi, the general idea of complementary contrasts is pervasive. Here 
are a few representative examples from the Dao De Jing. 
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The heavy is the root of the light. 
The still rules over the agitated.  
(Chapter 26, trans. Ivanhoe in Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001, 175) 
 
Turning back is how the Way moves. 
Weakness is how the Way operates. 
The world and all its creatures arise from what is there; 
What is there arises from what is not there.  
(Chapter 40, trans. Ivanhoe in Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001, 182) 
 
Le Guin once chided critics for misunderstanding this aspect of Daoism in her work 
as a sort of antagonism of opposites to which she offered a safe middle way. In pointing out 
this mistake, Le Guin shows that she had a nuanced understanding of this concept (Le Guin 
1976, 45). Le Guin’s fiction contains numerous examples of complementary contrasts. Yin 
and yang are explicitly mentioned in chapter 19 of The Left Hand of Darkness (Le Guin 
2010, 287). Consider also the poem that gives The Left Hand of Darkness its name, which 
appears in chapter 16. 
 
  Light is the left hand of darkness 
  And darkness the right hand of light. 
  Two are one, life and death, lying 
  Together like lovers in kemmer, 
  Like hands joined together, 
  Like the end and the way. 
   (Le Guin 2010, 252) 
Another clear example of complementary contrasts is the “Creation of Ëa” from A 
Wizard of Earthsea. 
 Only in silence the word, 
 Only in dark the light, 
 Only in dying life: 
 Bright the hawk’s flight  
on the empty sky. 
 (Le Guin 1989, epigraph)  
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Consider also Ged’s explanation of power in chapter nine of A Wizard of Earthsea, 
which demonstrates the complementariness and underlying unity of seemingly separate 
and contrasting things. 
All power is one in source and end, I think. Years and distances, stars and candles, 
water and wind and wizardry, the craft in a man’s hand and the wisdom in a tree’s 
root: they all arise together. My name, and yours, and the true name of the sun, or a 
spring of water, or an unborn child, all are syllables of the great word that is very 
slowly spoken by the shining of the stars. There is no other power. No other name. 
(Le Guin 1989, 164)6 
Non-Action (Wu Wei) 
The concept of wu wei, literally non-action, is one of the most important yet difficult 
concepts in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. This concept has been misunderstood in an 
Orientalist fashion as representing some kind of “Eastern” cultural trait of passivity. But the 
concept does not precisely mean not acting at all. It has more to do with what Paul 
Kjellberg calls “skillful living” (Kjellberg 1996, 13). Some scholars have translated wu wei as 
“effortless action” or “action without artifice” (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001, 393; 
Coutinho 2014, 100). The contemporary notion of “being in the zone” is also similar. The 
idea is mentioned several times in the Dao De Jing (e.g., chapters 43 and 48), but the famous 
story of Cook Ding from chapter three of the Zhuangzi is perhaps the best example. A cook 
who regularly butchers oxen has not had to sharpen his blade in nineteen years, which he 
explains by his ability to find the gaps in the joints. Sometimes he must overcome troubles, 
which he explains as follows. 
Nonetheless, whenever I come to a clustered triangle, realizing that it is difficult to 
do anything about it, I instead restrain myself as if terrified, until my seeing comes to 
a complete halt. My activity slows, and the blade moves ever so slightly. Then all at 
once, I find the ox already dismembered at my feet like clumps of soil scattered on 
the ground. I retract the blade and stand there gazing at my work arrayed around 
me, dawdling over it with satisfaction. Then I wipe off the blade and put it away. 
(Zhuangzi 3.4–3.6, trans. Ziporyn 2009, 23) 
Again, non-action should not be understood as literally doing nothing, but rather as 
acting in a more natural, effortless manner (although learning to act in such a way may 
ironically require a great deal of effort). My favorite example is this: when I walk up to a 
drinking fountain with motion detector sensors it does not work if I wave my hand in front 
of it as my over-thinking implies it should. But if I walk up to the water fountain naturally 
as if the water will come automatically, it does so without trouble. It is my over-thinking 
that caused the trouble. 
Le Guin’s novel The Lathe of Heaven is explicitly named for a line in Zhuangzi 
chapter 23: “Those who cannot do it will be destroyed on the lathe of heaven” (Le Guin 
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1973, 30). Le Guin later learned that “lathe” is a mistranslation, although she always 
maintained that the novel is a Daoist book (Le Guin 2012).7 More recently Ziporyn has 
translated this line as, “If there were anything that deviated from This, it would be 
destroyed in [the turning of] Heaven the Potter’s wheel” (Ziporyn 2009, 99). This line 
comes directly after a discussion of non-action, which Le Guin cites as the epigraph to 
chapter three of The Lathe of Heaven: 
Those whom heaven helps we call the sons of heaven. They do not learn this by 
learning. They do not work it by working. They do not reason it by reason. To let 
understanding stop at what cannot be understood is a high attainment. (Le Guin 
1973, 30).8  
Both The Lathe of Heaven and The Left Hand of Darkness feature protagonists who 
come to learn that their overt efforts at effecting change are ultimately harmful. In The 
Lathe of Heaven, George Orr eventually stops taking the advice of Dr. Haber to try to use his 
power to make his dreams reality to improve the world. In The Left Hand of Darkness, the 
novel’s protagonist Genly Ai learns in later chapters that his earlier efforts to force the 
success of his mission to incorporate Gethen into the interstellar political confederation of 
the Ekumen only led to misery.  
Something like non-action is also present in the methods of the Ekumen itself. In 
chapter 18 of The Left Hand of Darkness, Genly explains why he was sent as single 
ambassador to spend years alone on a strange planet. 
Alone, I cannot change your world. But I can be changed by it. Alone, I must listen, as 
well as speak. Alone, the relationship I finally make, if I make one, is not impersonal 
and not only political: it is individual, it is personal, it is both more and less than 
political. Not We and They; not I and It; but I and Thou. Not political, not pragmatic, 
but mystical. In a certain sense the Ekumen is not a body politic, but a body mystic. 
It considers beginnings to be extremely important. Beginnings, and means. Its 
doctrine is just the reverse of the doctrine that the ends justify the means. It 
proceeds, therefore, by subtle ways, and slow ones, and queer, risky ones; rather as 
evolution does, which is in a certain sense its model. (Le Guin 2010, 279).9 
Elizabeth Cummins Cogell has explored numerous examples of wu wei in Le Guin’s 
The Dispossessed, particularly the relevance of non-action as a source of Le Guin’s interest 
in anarchism as represented by the Anarresti people (Cogell 1979, 166–174; Le Guin 1975). 
While Le Guin was also influenced by modern anarchists like Emma Goldman, the Laozi 
contains several political passages in chapters 57–61 that have been read as representing a 
type of philosophical anarchism, which is in turn related to the concept of non-action on a 
political scale. 
Obviously, I could provide many more examples, and just as obviously I have merely 
scratched the surface of ways in which Daoism has influenced Le Guin’s work. Indeed, once 
one notices the Daoist elements of Le Guin’s fiction, it becomes difficult not to see Daoist 
ideas as pervasively and deeply embedded in Le Guin’s entire corpus. 
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“She Who Does Not Know Speaks?” Critiques of Misrepresentation and Orientalist 
Cultural Appropriation 
While it is clear that Le Guin considered her own work to reflect Daoist themes, her 
incorporation of Daoism has itself been subject to a number of critiques. I will focus on two 
types of critiques: first, that Le Guin is misrepresenting Daoism, and second, that, as a white 
American writing about Daoism, Le Guin may be engaging in a form of harmful Orientalist 
cultural appropriation. 
Paul R. Goldin (2002) has criticized Le Guin’s translation of the Dao De Jing for 
inaccuracies and misrepresentations. For instance, he points out that Le Guin’s translation 
of chapter 25 leaves out a reference to a king, which is clearly present in the text; Le Guin 
even admits to omitting it because it did not follow her sense of the text (Goldin 2002, 190–
191, Laozi 1998, 114–115). One could extend this criticism to Le Guin’s fiction as well. 
Insofar as many readers come to Le Guin’s fiction knowing little about Daoism, perhaps we 
should take seriously the extent to which her fiction is itself a source of knowledge for her 
audience, especially because Le Guin is often mixing ideas from classical premodern 
Daoism with ideas from modern feminism and modern anarchism (Lothian 2006, Habib 
2007). For instance, her anarchic interpretation of Daoism can be seen most prominently in 
her depiction of the Odonian philosophy in The Dispossessed. While some scholars have 
interpreted the Laozi as advocating a kind of anarchism10, it is worth noting that Le Guin is 
taking a particular interpretive stance when it comes to philosophical Daoism, a stance that 
may not be evident to readers otherwise unfamiliar with Daoist philosophical texts and the 
scholarship surrounding them. 
Alexis Lothian (2006) has also wondered if, as a white American author, Le Guin 
may be engaging in a form of harmful cultural appropriation despite her move toward a 
more inclusive feminism in her later work. Lothian presents this at the end of her article on 
Le Guin as a question for further research: “Or perhaps questions of cultural appropriation 
might be considered—are there uncomfortable implications in a white American woman’s 
adoption of the Tao Te Ching, in her writing a science fiction novel to memorialize the 
destruction of Taoism in China?” (Lothian 2006, 392). 
 While Lothian does not further delve into this question, Betsy Huang (2008) has 
answered it in her discussion of Le Guin’s work as a type of Orientalist cultural 
appropriation. For my purposes in this paper and with regard to this specific issue, I will 
take Orientalism to be a specific type of cultural appropriation, so that Huang is offering a 
specific answer to Lothian’s question. While a complete discussion of Orientalism is beyond 
my scope here, I will loosely define Orientalism in the sense popularized by Edward Said 
(1979) as the tendency to view especially Middle Eastern and Asian cultures as essentially 
Other (exotic, mystical, feminine, etc.) in opposition to the West’s presumed Self 
(familiarity, rationality, masculinity, etc.). The history of Orientalism is explicitly tied to the 
history of European imperialism, when it functioned as an ideological justification for 
colonialism, but Said and others have argued that Orientalism persists in the postcolonial 
era in the way that many Western people view the Middle East and Asia: the West often 
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does not let these other cultures speak for themselves, instead creating a simplified, false 
image for its own purposes. 
Huang argues that Le Guin’s fiction employs ideas from premodern Daoism for the 
sake of cognitive estrangement in the sense explained by Darko Suvin (1979). For Huang, 
this is a form of Orientalism because it casts Daoism as primarily the cure for, or alternative 
to, harmful Western philosophies; Le Guin’s picture of Daoism primarily serves Western 
needs and exists in Western imagination (Huang 2008, 26–27). Huang claims that Le Guin 
presents an “idealization of a Daoist-influenced passive, non-interventionist mode of 
existence…” (Huang 2008, 27). 
For both Le Guin and her contemporary Philip K. Dick, 
Daoist thought is sufficiently alien from Western psycho-rationalist models to be 
depicted as a psychological dysfunction or social disorder. The central tenet of 
Daoism, inaction, is particularly vulnerable to being cast as weakness or failure; 
after all, the unwillingness or inability to act in a society that encourages action and 
activism above all else can only be portrayed as a pathological disorder. Yet it is 
precisely this perceived vulnerability of Daoism that sustained its popularity 
throughout the postwar decades because it presents the East as passive, restrained, 
and non-threatening. (Huang 2008, 28) 
Huang describes The Lathe of Heaven as “a cautionary fable that pits what Le Guin 
sees as the indiscretions of Western reason and scientific positivism against the benign 
qualities of Eastern mysticism” (Huang 2008, 29). While Huang admits that Le Guin 
attempts to depict Daoism positively in The Lathe of Heaven, both through George Orr and 
the aliens that arrive later in the novel, she offers a critique of the way in which Daoist 
ideas are presented: 
Reminiscent of the trope of the supportive oriental sage who nurtures a young 
Western hero’s quest for truth and self-identity (the monks in the television series 
Kung Fu and Mr. Miyagi in the feature film The Karate Kid come to mind), the aliens 
impart proverbial “fortune-cookie” wisdom to Orr. (Huang 2008, 30) 
Huang sums up some of the harm of this sort of Orientalist approach to science fiction as 
follows.  
The “Orient” is the path but rarely the destination, and the characters who embody 
it are tools for, but not the architects of, the West’s construction of its future … The 
Western romance of the Orient imagines it as passive and pacifist, while the 
Western humanist imperative for Asians is to act, to protest. (Huang 2008, 39) 
While of course I implore readers to read Huang’s article for themselves (it also 
contains interesting critiques of Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High Castle and Maureen F. 
McHugh’s China Mountain Zhang), I might add a bit of clarification. As I see it, Huang’s 
target of criticism is not so much that Le Guin includes Daoist concepts, but the way in 
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which Le Guin includes them and the uses to which she puts these ideas. The relevant 
questions to consider are: To what purposes does Le Guin put Daoist ideas? Can these uses 
fully or partially be understood as harmful Orientalist cultural appropriation, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally? 
Given the importance of Daoism in Le Guin’s life and work, I think these questions 
ought to be taken seriously. Ignoring them is not an option, at least if one wants to take Le 
Guin seriously as an artist and a thinker. If Huang’s critique in particular seems prima facie 
outlandish to some readers, I ask them to take a particularly Le Guinian stance to attempt 
to imagine why someone might present such a critique, not so much to justify this critique 
but to understand it. 
Le Guin’s Work as Transformative and Cross-Cultural 
I propose that taking these critiques seriously requires a deeper rethinking of what, 
exactly, Le Guin was doing in her fiction. I suggest that Le Guin was not trying to represent 
ancient Daoism as a scholarly authority. Rather, she was inspired by Daoism as a creative 
artist and philosopher in her own right. 
In her introduction to The Left Hand of Darkness, Le Guin explains what she sees as 
the effect a good novel has on its reader. 
 
In reading a novel, any novel, we have to know perfectly well that the whole thing is 
nonsense, and then, while reading, believe every word of it. Finally, when we’re 
done with it, we may find—if it’s a good novel—that we’re a bit different than from 
what we were before we read it, that we have been changed a little, as if by having 
met a new face, crossed a street we never crossed before. But it’s very hard to say 
just what we learned, how we were changed. (Le Guin 2010, xviii) 
 
In her essay “A War Without End,” Le Guin explains one of the tasks of her fiction. 
 
To me the important thing is not to offer any specific hope of betterment, but, by 
offering an imagined yet persuasive alternate reality, to dislodge my mind, and so 
the reader’s mind, from the lazy, timorous habit of thinking that the way we live 
now is the only way people can live. It is that inertia that allows the institutions of 
injustice to continue unquestioned. (Le Guin 2004, 218) 
  
Much like the ancient Greek and Roman ideal of philosophy as a way of life or as 
therapeutic (Hadot 1995, Nussbaum 1994) or the idea that philosophy ought to transform 
the person as found in many Indian and Western philosophers (Taber 1983, Ganeri 2010), 
Le Guin’s point is that her art does not merely entertain, it transforms readers and expands 
their sense of what is possible.  
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Expanding one’s sense of what is possible is a benefit of philosophy as well, whether 
through contemplation of the metaphysical edifices of great philosophers like Plato, 
Dushun, Śaṅkara, or Spinoza, or through contemplation of issues such as external-world 
skepticism and thought experiments about zombies or runaway trolleys. As Bertrand 
Russell wrote, 
 
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, 
since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake 
of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of 
what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic 
assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through 
the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind is also 
rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which 
constitutes its highest good. (Russell 1959, 161) 
 
Like the philosophers mentioned, Le Guin hopes that her readers will be 
transformed, at least a little, even if they cannot quite articulate the ways in which they 
have changed. 
Such transformative intentions are also present in the Daoist tradition. Paul 
Kjellberg argues that the point of the Zhuangzi is not to articulate a theory of the good life 
but to help readers to engage in “skillful living” (Kjellberg 1996, 13). Given her earlier 
quotations, it seems that Le Guin’s own interpretation of Daoism is similar in that she 
hopes her work will do something to the reader. 
However, as Elizabeth Cogell puts it, “To argue that Le Guin has been influenced by 
Taoism is not to rule out additional influences nor to say that Taoism totally explains her 
writing” (Cogell 1979, 179). I would argue that Le Guin is doing something similar to what 
contemporary philosophers Mark Siderits and Jay Garfield refer to as “fusion philosophy” 
or “cross-cultural philosophy” respectively (Siderits 2003, xi, Garfield 2002, viii). Garfield 
explains his philosophical methodology as follows. 
 
I prefer to think of my enterprise in these pages as an exploration of cross-cultural 
philosophy rather than as an exercise in “comparative philosophy.” That is, my goal 
is not so much to juxtapose texts from distinct traditions to notice similarities and 
differences as it is to do philosophy, with lots of texts, lots of perspectives, and lots 
of hermeneutical traditions—to make the resources of diverse traditions and their 
scholars available to one another and to create new dialogues. (Garfield 2002, viii) 
 
As Le Guin noted several times (e.g., Le Guin 1976), she was influenced by a wide 
variety of authors and ideas. I have already noted two other major strands in her work: 
modern feminism and modern anarchism.11 Like Siderits and Garfield, I see Le Guin’s work 
as an attempt to bring these disparate influences together to create something new and 
interesting.12  
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Putting all of this together, I would like to suggest that Le Guin is not so much 
offering classical Daoist insights in science fictional form as much as she is offering a 
creative reinterpretation of Daoism itself, one that I call science fictional feminist Daoism.13 
I am not claiming that Le Guin was necessarily herself cognizant of this, but it is an 
interpretation that I think makes sense of her fiction.14 
Feminist Features of Le Guin’s Science Fictional Daoism 
Having explained some of the connections between Le Guin’s science fiction and Daoism, I 
should say a bit more about her connections to feminism. As Le Guin herself noted and as 
many scholars have discussed, her relationship to feminism changed over the course of her 
career (Lothian 2006 and Clarke 2010 are good discussions on this point).  
Le Guin’s juxtaposition of premodern Daoism and modern feminism is not 
unprecedented. Modern scholars have, for instance, gone back to look at philosophical 
contributions from Daoist women writers such as Yu Xuanji (c. 844–868) and Sun Bu-er (c. 
1119–1182).15 Furthermore, there have been critical feminist philosophical readings of 
classical Daoist ideas.16 
While I will not attempt to define feminism here, it is uncontroversial to say that 
feminist philosophers are often focused, at least in part, on interrogating and rethinking 
concepts of gender. And Le Guin did just this from relatively early in her career, perhaps 
most famously in The Left Hand of Darkness (1969). This novel is set on the planet Gethen 
where humans are androgynous except during their sexually-active phase of kemmer, in 
which they take can take on what most other humans would think of as either male or 
female reproductive capabilities. 
A field report from an Ekumen anthropologist visiting Gethen includes the 
following. 
Consider: Anyone can turn his hand to anything. This sounds very simple, but its 
psychological effects are incalculable. The fact that everyone between seventeen and 
thirty-five or so is liable to be … “tied down by childbearing,” implies that no one is 
quite so thoroughly “tied down” here as women, elsewhere, are likely to be—
psychologically or physically. Burden and privilege are shared out pretty equally; 
everybody has the same risk to run or choice to make. Therefore nobody here is 
quite so free as a free male anywhere else. (Le Guin 2010, 100) 
Le Guin also plays with the reader’s gender associations, writing for instance, “My 
landlady, a voluble man…” (Le Guin 2010, 49) or “The king was pregnant” (Le Guin 2010, 
106). 
Nonetheless, some of Le Guin’s critics have noted that her early novels, while 
questioning concepts of gender, had yet to move beyond a privileging of heterosexual and 
male perspectives. The Left Hand of Darkness, for instance, never discusses the possibility of 
anything other than heterosexual pairings during Gethenians sexually-active phase of 
kemmer. The novel also uses the male pronoun “he” as an allegedly gender-neutral 
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pronoun. Le Guin herself later came to criticize both of these aspects of the novel in an 
essay that encapsulates much of how she rethought feminism during her career: “Is Gender 
Necessary? – Redux” (Le Guin 1992, 155–172). In this essay, originally written in 1988, Le 
Guin writes footnotes explicitly criticizing both The Left Hand of Darkness and her original 
1976 essay, “Is Gender Necessary?” 
Later in her career in novels such as Four Ways to Forgiveness (1995) and The 
Telling (2000), Le Guin’s focus changed to decentering men’s perspectives and to centering 
women’s perspectives. Such novels came to approach feminist philosophy more in the 
sense described by Rosemarie Tong, who defines feminist philosophy as “a discussion of 
philosophical concerns that refuses to identify the human experience with the male 
experience” (Tong 1995, 262). 
Likewise, a lot of Daoist philosophy concerns challenging the reader to rethink one’s 
typical perspectives. A good example is Zhuangzi’s common tactic of encouraging the 
reader to imagine perspectives of different humans and animals (e.g., Zhuangzi 2:38–41, 
trans. Ziporyn 2009, 17–19; Zhuangzi, Ch. 17, trans. Ziporyn 2009, 76).17 Similarly, what 
literary theorist Darko Suvin (1979) has described as the “estrangement” of science fiction 
invites the reader to consider—even to momentarily inhabit—new ideas and perspectives. 
As I hope is clear, Le Guin’s feminist influences are not at all opposed to her Daoist 
or science fictional influences, and in fact she engages in a creative juxtaposition of these 
ideas. She often turns the type of creative rethinking one finds in the Zhuangzi toward 
gender concepts. For instance, just as the Zhuangzi encourages readers to reconsider 
whether human perspectives can yield complete knowledge of reality or whether death is 
to be hated (Zhuangzi 2:38, 2:41, trans. Ziporyn 2009, 18–19), so does Le Guin challenge 
the reader’s gender associations in The Left Hand of Darkness in the ways discussed earlier 
in this section.  
I am not claiming that Daoism is inherently feminist, although Le Guin has argued 
that Daoist ideals have more feminist potential than more explicitly patriarchal aspects of 
ancient Chinese cultures (Le Guin 1992, 164–165). Yet the way that Le Guin weaves 
together her influences shows that feminism, Daoism, and science fiction are all important 
ingredients of her work. 
Thus, my claim is that Le Guin’s reimagining of Daoism in a science fictional context 
is accomplished primarily by bringing together strands of premodern Daoism and modern 
feminism in the sense of cross-cultural philosophy discussed in the previous section. Daoist 
ideas about non-action can also challenge many modern Western feminist conceptions of 
action and agency, encouraging readers to appreciate ways of interacting with the world 
outside of ways stereotypically coded as masculine in the West, as seen in works such as 
The Lathe of Heaven. In doing so, Le Guin encourages a transformation of both Daoism and 
feminism—a feminist rethinking of Daoism and a Daoist rethinking of feminism. 
As I discussed in the methodological prelude, one type of rethinking involved in Le 
Guinian philosophy is a reconsideration of the combat metaphor that guides a lot of 
contemporary philosophy. Combat metaphors are associated with traits like aggression 
and zero-sum conflicts with clear winners and losers, which are in turn typically associated 
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with masculinity (not precisely men, because of course women and others can be 
aggressive and engage in zero-sum conflicts, but I’m referring to masculinity as a broader 
concept that, while often associated with men, is not exclusively tied to a single gender). I 
suggest—as a move in an ongoing conversation—that there is a further, deeper sense in 
which Le Guinian philosophy could be an extension of Le Guin’s feminist project. Le Guinian 
philosophy might seek to decenter masculine perspectives by challenging combat as a 
guiding metaphor for philosophy. A good example of this shift in perspective in Le Guin’s 
work is the ending of A Wizard of Earthsea, in which the main character Ged embraces and 
merges with his shadow self instead of seeking its defeat (Le Guin 1989, 179). Another 
example is Le Guin’s statement that she does not like villainy: in The Lathe of Heaven, for 
instance, Dr. Haber is not a villain, but rather he is attempting to do good while not being in 
tune with reality (Le Guin 2012). 
A New Perspective? 
Does reorienting our understanding of Le Guin’s fiction in the way I have suggested give 
new resources for responding to the critiques that she is misrepresenting Daoism or 
engaging in Orientalist cultural appropriation? 
It seems to me that the first critique somewhat misses the point, at least with regard 
to Le Guin’s fiction. A translation ought to aim for some fidelity to the original text 
(although Le Guin herself did not necessarily agree). I do think Goldin’s critiques of 
translations by Le Guin and others who do not know much classical Chinese are fair: taking 
Le Guin’s translation of the Dao De Jing as the authoritative final word on the text would be 
intellectually irresponsible for anyone who cares about understanding classical Daoism 
historically, culturally, and philosophically. 
But it seems to me that as an author of fiction Le Guin never set out to give a 
scholarly or culturally-immersed representation of Daoist philosophy or practice. To what 
extent can an artist be guilty of misrepresentation if representation was not, strictly 
speaking, her goal? Of course, some Western readers will take Le Guin’s word on Daoism 
either in her translation or her fiction, but it is not clear whether we should hold the author 
responsible for the type of intellectual laziness that would let one’s exclusive source on 
ancient Chinese philosophy be a contemporary American author of science fiction and 
fantasy. Others may be inspired by Le Guin’s fiction to explore classical Daoist texts for 
themselves, embarking on journeys that go beyond Le Guin’s own understanding. She 
would be pleased with such an outcome, or at least not opposed to it. 
Did Le Guin think of herself as a Daoist? Not exactly. She once described herself as 
“an unconsistent Taoist and consistent unChristian” (Le Guin and Ketterer 1975, 139). This 
makes sense within the framework I explained in the previous section: Le Guin is not trying 
to explain Daoism or even really to be a Daoist with any pretentions of authenticity or 
consistency with some authoritative idea of what Daoism should be. Rather, she is 
profoundly influenced by Daoism along the way to her own creative output. 
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The second critique, that Le Guin is engaging in Orientalist cultural appropriation, is 
more complicated. It is obviously the case that Le Guin was a white American drawing on 
Daoist ideas in writing science fiction and fantasy. But Le Guin was not a dilettante who, 
after reading one translation late in life, elected herself to the post of sole authority on 
Daoism at the expense of everyone else. It is not unreasonable to say that Daoism was part 
of her philosophical make-up from a young age. These ideas transformed her throughout 
her life. Her personal background does not settle the case, but it opens up a new 
perspective on the classic model of cultural appropriation. 
The classic model of cultural appropriation is one where white Westerners take up 
an aspect of another culture they find useful or charming while ignoring cultural history 
and real people’s connections to that cultural product. Such a model can sometimes be 
found in some American yoga studios’ Orientalist representations of India, white people 
performing Native American religious rituals, racist sports mascots, or white musicians 
appropriating the musical styles of African Americans. And even in these cases, a lot 
depends on context. Do the people in question have any connection to the relevant cultures, 
through scholarship, personal connections, language, etc.? Do they consider themselves to 
be authorities on the matter in question over and above the authorities within the relevant 
culture? Are they exploiting false, harmful stereotypes for material or social gain at the 
expense of people in the relevant culture? Do they have the attitude of a humble learner or 
of an authoritative lecturer—or worse yet, of a white savior saving the “authentic” tradition 
from its negligent keepers? 
Huang’s (2008) point is not that Le Guin is some 19th century British imperialist 
learning about a culture merely to better dominate it economically and politically. A 
different type of Orientalism might be called “benevolent Orientalism,” a framework in 
which the other culture is represented as superior to Western culture but entirely from 
within a Western perspective (e.g., “Tibet is such a spiritual country, unlike we materialistic 
Americans,” or “Daoism is in harmony with nature unlike the environmentally destructive 
West”). In so far as Le Guin thinks Daoism is superior to the more dualistic ideas popular in 
Western thought, there may be some sense in which she fits this concept. And the Daoist 
elements of her fiction do seem to be at least part of how she creates the effect of 
estrangement in her mostly Western audience. 
To push a bit deeper still, though, I think a lot of the discussion on Orientalism and 
cultural appropriation relies on the idea of a mono-cultural person, a person steeped 
merely in a single coherent culture. I think this idea is, properly speaking, a myth. For 
instance, many aspects of what we consider to be “Western” culture were influenced by 
cultures we would call “non-Western.” Just a few examples are the Egyptian and 
Babylonian influences on early Greek mathematics and philosophy, the contact and 
possible influences between Greek and Indian skeptical philosophers in antiquity, the fact 
that the Roman Empire included large parts of North Africa and the Middle East, the huge 
influence of Islamic philosophy on Medieval European philosophy, and the myriad cultural 
influences engendered by European colonialism into the postcolonial era.18 
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On a related note, we should not pretend that “the West” is anything like a natural 
kind, philosophically speaking. The whole idea of “the West” as a hermetically sealed 
package produced by a handful of men in a few European countries is, to borrow a term 
from film and television, a massive ret-con job. For instance, Plato did not think of himself 
as “Western” or as part of “the same culture” or “the same race” as “barbarians” in modern 
day Germany or England; he had far more in common with Egyptians, Phoenicians, and 
other ancient Mediterranean people. 
Given the extent to which human cultures have been influencing one another 
throughout history, I think the idea of a strictly mono-cultural person has been myth for 
thousands of years. Models of cultural appropriation and Orientalism often seem to rely on 
a model wherein a mono-cultural person takes on another culture from within their mono-
cultural view through a mono-cultural lens. Note that I am not claiming something like this 
has never been the case, as when Western people with little or no experience or training in 
the philosophy or literature of another culture appoint themselves experts on that culture. 
But Le Guin would not seem to fit this model in any simplistic sense, neither in her personal 
history nor in the depth of her work. 
Let us consider Le Guin’s position. She grew up in the United States as a white 
person, which gave her Western cultural influences. But she also had other influences early 
on. And Daoism was perhaps the biggest non-Western influence on her intellectual 
development. She was not merely using Daoism to create a sense of estrangement in her 
Western readers, as a simplistic model of Orientalist cultural appropriation would have it; 
rather, Daoism was part of her intellectual makeup from an early age, so it might be more 
proper to say Daoism was part of her creative self-expression as an author. 
Le Guin’s education in Daoism came almost exclusively through translations into 
English, so it might be argued that Orientalism was enacted within the larger cultural and 
translational project rather than one solitary science fiction author. This may be true, at 
least partially and unintentionally. I do think Huang has a point in that Le Guin may have 
unintentionally included problematic depictions of Daoist ideas. While of course Le Guin 
cannot control how readers interpret her works, in Western cultures many readers will 
take up these Daoist ideas from within a larger cultural framework of Orientalism. Huang’s 
point is not that Le Guin was a bad individual, but that within the larger cultural context of 
20th century America, Le Guin’s use of Daoist ideas might have Orientalist effects. By 
analogy, in recent decades many have defined “racism” as primarily a structural issue 
rather than merely a personal moral failing. The point is not so much that Le Guin is 
personally an Orientalist, but that her fiction might have deleterious effects within a larger 
culture. 
None of us in any culture can escape the effects of colonialism in a post-colonial 
world, although the ways in which these tendencies affect people depend of course on their 
cultural locations. For example, Orientalist myths about the “passive, irrational East” affect 
people in Asia and Asian diasporas differently and more harmfully than they affect white 
Western people. Much the same could be said, of course, for any other type of stereotyping.  
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But I would like to think that if there is a way out of our Eurocentric world 
condition, it is through patient learning, hybrid education, and being open to wisdom from 
all sources, but without reducing those sources to Western needs or Orientalist 
preconceptions. Whether Le Guin or anyone else can live up to this ideal in the early 21st 
century, I cannot say. But I do hope that it will be possible one day, and I would like to think 
that Le Guin’s fiction represents a partial, imperfect attempt to envision what a non-
Eurocentric world might look like. Contemporary Indian philosopher B. K. Matilal wrote 
that the problem with both negative and “benevolent” Orientalist myths—aside from the 
fact that they are false—is that “The Oriental man is either subhuman or superhuman, 
never human. … there cannot be any horizontal relationship between East and West” 
(Matilal 2002, 373, italics in original). Perhaps Le Guin’s fiction can help us to imagine, 
however imperfectly, what such a horizontal relationship might look like. 
Being true to Le Guin’s legacy of highlighting the subtleties and ambiguities of 
human life forces me to admit that my understanding of her work does not solve all 
problems. I am not saying we as readers and scholars should not hold her work 
accountable for misrepresentation or Orientalist cultural appropriation. I do not claim to be 
an arbiter clearing her of all personal charges in some court of public opinion, nor do I 
claim victory over other scholars in some philosophical combat. Much as some editions of 
Le Guin’s The Dispossessed contain the subtitle, “An ambiguous utopia,” so is my conclusion 
an ambiguous conclusion. My “opponents” have a point: I am neither declaring my victory 
nor their defeat. Instead, these conversations should continue. 
We should be more cognizant both of the resources within Daoist philosophies 
themselves and of Le Guin’s work as a creative artist and philosopher as we continue 
nuanced discussions of her work and its philosophical depth. This is better done by 
engaging in philosophy with the guiding metaphor of ongoing conversation rather than 
metaphors of combat in the senses I discussed in the methodological prelude. One of the 
lessons we learn from Le Guin’s work—a lesson I have attempted to enact here—is that 
everything is more complicated than we think it is.19 Understanding her fiction 
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1 A video and transcript of this speech can be found in Le Guin 2014. 
2 Note that I prefer the pinyin method of Romanization (e.g., “Daoism”) as opposed to the older 
Wade-Giles method (e.g., “Taoism”). 
3 For instance, see Le Guin and Ketterer 1975, 139; Le Guin 1976, 45; Le Guin 1982, 39; and Le 
Guin 2017, 40. 
4 For example, see Barbour 1974, Cogell 1979, Hayles 1979, Spivack 1984, Cummins 1990, 
Wytenbroek 1990, Lindow 2004, Lothian 2006, Huang 2008, and Li 2016. 
5 I recommend that readers interested in these issues start with Coutinho 2014 and Ivanhoe and 
Van Norden 2001. 
6 Wytenbroek 1990 focuses exclusively on the Daoist themes in Le Guin’s Earthsea novels. 
7 Perhaps there is another resonance between The Lathe of Heaven and the famous story of the 
butterfly dream in Zhuangzi chapter 2 (2:48–49). This is never explicitly mentioned in the novel, 
but it is possible Le Guin had it in mind. 
8 Here is Ziporyn’s translation of the same passage: 
Aided by the Heavenly, one is called a Son of Heaven. One who wants truly to learn should 
learn what cannot be learned. One who wants truly to take action should do what no 
deliberate action can do. One who wants truly to distinguish what is so by debate should 
distinguish what no debate can distinguish to be so. When understanding stops and rests on 
what is not understood, it has reached its perfection. (Zhuangzi chapter 23, trans. Ziporyn 
2009, 99) 
9 It’s also worth noting that in mentioning the modern scientific concept of evolution, Le Guin is 
demonstrating that her influences go beyond Daoism (although of course modern ideas of 
biological evolution are not necessarily in contrast with Daoist ideas). Another strong Daoist 
element in The Left Hand of Darkness can be found in the Haddara religion’s emphasis on the value 
of ignorance. A member of that religion tells Genly that the purpose of foretelling is “To exhibit the 
perfect uselessness of knowing the answer to the wrong question” (Le Guin 2010, 74). Compare this 
with the Zhuangzi’s image of the useless tree (1:14, Ziporyn 2009, 8) or the following comment in 
chapter 22: “Not knowing is profound; knowing is shallow” (Ziporyn 2009, 90). 
10 See Laozi chapters 57–61. For more on the scholarly issues surrounding anarchic 
interpretations, see Coutinho 2014, 71–73. 
11 N. B. Hayles has argued that Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness is a cohesive artistic whole not 
despite but rather in virtue of its disparate ideas; it is “an example of the creative fecundity that is 
possible when differences are not suppressed by used to create a new whole” (Hayles 1979, 115).  
12 Although I should note that Le Guin is somewhat less focused on solving problems than Siderits: 
“To those who see problem-solving as central to philosophy, and who also believe that 
counterposing of distinct traditions can yield useful results in this endeavor, the name ‘fusion 
philosophy’ seems appropriate” (Siderits 2003, xi). However, one might say that Le Guin’s hope is 
that her work will contribute to solving problems further down the line in imagining better ways of 
living. 
13 I suspect relatively few scholars of literature have noticed the extent to which Le Guin is 
reworking the ideas themselves, because for literature scholars philosophies tend to be “theory” 
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that one applies to texts for the sake of interpretation or inspiration that one finds in an author for 
the sake of explaining the text. However, for philosophers—and philosophical authors like Le 
Guin—the philosophies themselves are inspirations for new ideas, new ways of seeing the world. 
For Le Guin there is no sense in which the theory can be separated from the text; theory and text 
are, appropriately enough, complementary contrasts that are aspects of a single thing. 
14 Le Guin herself noted in her response to an issue of Science Fiction Studies devoted to her work 
that some of the scholarly articles 
dealt almost exclusively with ideas. They gave me the impression that I have written about 
nothing but ideas, and I was enormously impressed with myself. By God! did I really think 
all that? – The answer is, No. I didn’t. I did think some of it. The rest of it I felt, or stole, or 
faked, or intuited; in any case achieved, not deliberately and not through the use of frontal 
lobes, but through humbler and obscurer means, involving (among others) imagery, 
metaphors, characters, landscapes, the sound of English words, the restrictions of English 
syntax, the rests and rhythms of narrative paragraphs. (Le Guin 1976, 44) 
15 For translations of some of Yu’s and Sun’s poetry, see Bonevac and Phillips 2009, 70-74. 
16 For examples of modern feminist philosophical engagements with premodern Daoist 
philosophies, see Lee 2014 and Jiang 2014. 
17 Le Guin explores animal perspectives as well as profound questions about language and art in 
her short story “The Author of the Acacia Seeds” (Le Guin 2016, 617-625). 
18 While most of these examples are (or ought to be) common knowledge, readers interested in 
possible contact between Greek and Indian philosophers in antiquity should begin by consulting 
Flintoff 1980. It is also worth noting that the first ancient Greek philosopher, Thales, lived in what is 
today Turkey, and great Western philosophers such as Augustine and Hypatia lived in North Africa. 
19 Including this statement. Some readers may find this statement to be trite or platitudinous, but I 
suggest that this reaction itself fails to take the lesson seriously. Much like Laozi and Zhuangzi 
encourage readers to consider new perspectives and destabilize simplistic, dogmatic views, Le 
Guin’s fiction encourages us to reconsider the ways we think about gender, politics, economics, 
culture, etc. beyond any easy, simplified answers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
